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Athens: Between Tyranny and Democracy *

Konrad H. Kinzl

 

K.H. Kinzl (ed.): Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 1977. ISBN 3-11-006637-8

© K.H. Kinzl

 

   

   

 

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1It is a familiar picture of undeniably Aristotelian (and late-nineteenth-century) features: Athenian Democracy evolved step by step and without reverses from Kleisthenes on. History, however, does not know Aristotle, nor his teleology. Cracks in this classicistic marble monument have been pointed out: the most serious challenge on one particular question of detail came from Badian in 1971.2 The first comprehensive attempt, however, at rewriting Athenian constitutional history from Kleisthenes to Ephialtes was not made until more recently. Jochen Martin's formulations in the concluding pages of his paper would deserve to be quoted extensively. The following, however, must suffice: "Die Demokratie in Athen war nicht das Ergebnis eines bewußt auf Demokratisierung ausgerichteten Handelns."3

The thoughts expressed in the present paper were conceived in their general thrust before I obtained a copy of Martin's study. I shall here deal with only those problems to which I may be able to add a new aspect. My approach will be chronological, if only for the sake of convenience.4

 

   

   

 

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1.  From Hippias to Isagoras.  —  The question of citizenship is in many societies a preoccupation of especial urgency; citizenship was instantly to become the most important issue after the departure of the Peisistratids. The so-called Diapsephismos5 represented a first attempt at restoring order in the citizenship: some citizens were disfranchised,6 others were confirmed,7 and still others were newly enrolled in the four tribes by Kleisthenes.8 A decree outlawing the use of torture on Athenian citizens was passed in the archonship of Skamandrios,9 plausibly placed in

 

   

   

 

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510/09.10 these and other proceedings Kleisthenes will have enlisted the support of a sufficient number of fellow nobles with their following in their home districts:11 Kleisthenes surely was active in concrete terms (more concrete than "throwing weight", "coming off worse", and "acquiring the Demos", as Hdt. 5,66; 5,69,2 pleases to put it), in order to be evicted by the same Spartan king who had recently led him back.

In the turbulent times after the liberation from tyranny the so-called Diapsephismos and related measures quite conceivably had turned out in a fashion which was apt to cause confusion. Isagoras, about whose ideas as to how Athens should be governed we are well informed, regarded it his duty to restore order by calling in Kleomenes once more. His concept of order was arbitrary and his methods despotic; he was thwarted by the aristocratic majority which had been forged by Kleisthenes: the Council of Four-Hundred resisted its demise, its followers among the common people rallied in support,12 Isagoras and his party sought refuge on the Akropolis and surrendered on the third day. Kleisthenes returned once more.13

 

   

   

 

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2.  From Isagoras to 501/500.  —  One often reads that Kleisthenes achieved this and that Kleisthenes accomplished that, as if he occupied a position of superior power — a new Solon, as it were. As a former archon eponymos14 it is true that he sat on the Areios-Pagos-Council; otherwise his political power was of an unofficial15 nature. It is the politician Kleisthenes who moved the reform bills, not the holder of office. The lessons he had learnt during and after the era of the Peisistratids he shared with numerous members of the Attic aristocracy.16 It was only the latter who could deliver the mass vote in the Assembly.17 The politician Kleisthenes, in order to obtain these votes, must have relied on a consensus of a majority of his fellow nobles. To ascribe to the laws of Kleisthenes intentions blatantly anti-aristocratic is unrealistic: the example of Isagoras splendidly demonstrates how one could fail by ignoring the realities of politics. Kleisthenes stands out as the symbol not of the towering statesman who, possessed by visions of a democratic Athens, undeterred moves to carry them out in total isolation from political reality, but of the practical politician who succeeded in practising consensus politics against the background of both the experiences and mistakes of the past and the most urgent needs of the present, aristocrat in an aristocratic environment. A re-examination of the development of the Athenian constitution in the late sixth century, however, will inevitably have to turn first to the figure of Kleisthenes. We need not concern ourselves with the "minimalists": we may take it for granted that the man who could prevail on the priests of Delphoi to abandon the Peisistratids,18 who was instrumental in ac-

 

   

   

 

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complishing a major revamping of Athenian government — that this man cannot be reduced to a failed would-be-tyrant or less.19 On the other hand, we should not, as historians, concern ourselves with what might be called the "optimalist's" approach.

Connected with citizenship20 are property-rights, marriage-rights, participation in the political and judicial bodies, and other factors of great concern — not to mention the most significant of all, namely, the irrational element. If the so-called Diapsephismos was at least partly a miscarriage, measures surely had to be taken to prevent future injustice and disorder. In the form of the new administrative demoi-structure the Attic State, now for the first time in its history, was put on a firm, unshakable basis — in contrast to the previous condition of a loose conglomerate of overlapping blocks determined by such diverse factors as region,21 clan allegiance, communion of cult,22 kinship.23 A clearly defined procedure, regulated by the principle of due process of law and placing the responsibility with the demotai, was finally created for the purpose of controlling and administering citizenship. Kleisthenes evidently had learnt the lesson well24 which he and Athens had been taught.25

The introduction of the administration of Attica based on the demoi can be described as nothing less than a measure of truly unique importance for the development of politics and society in Athens over the next several centuries. By following Aristotle26 this move is often represented as having been designed to shake up and tear down the old established links of kinship throughout Attica. I do not propose here to argue either against or in favour of the view that eventually this was achieved, since the final result does not necessarily, and not even as a rule, reveal the intents and purposes of the original move. Just as in most wars armies are best

 

   

   

 

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prepared to fight the previous war, political reform only too often fails to cure the problems of the present, while it would have cured those of the past, and its accomplishments may never have been intended.

It is for considerations of the above kind, namely, that the demoi reform was prompted by recent experience, that I abandoned the chronology27 suggested by Herodotos. Since the so-called Diapsephismos and the demoi reform were both aimed at one and the same problem — citizenship — , and since the second measure is far more incisive than the first, I cannot but conclude that the second act of reform was designed to supersede and correct the first action, which represented little more than the application of existing procedures. While it is not impossible that Kleisthenes and his collaborators recognized the need for more far-reaching measures and actually introduced legislation inaugurating reform even before the usurpation of Isagoras and the intervention of Kleomenes, this does not appear to be more than a possibility. Historical probability would suggest a more distinctive, if not violent, interlude (such as the Isagoras affair) as the cause for the peripeteia of the demoi reform.

The demoi in their new role will no doubt also have allowed for the development (or continuation) of local allegiances, loyalties, identities — yet by scattering it through well over a hundred28 such small units a stronger sense of common identity on the part of all Athenians was created.29 In the past the great heads of the great, supra-regional clans had been able to exert far more influence on the affairs of state than they would under the new order. The heads of the numerous houses could now more independently secure greater influence at the local level. A body of followers large enough and powerful enough to frustrate lawful

 

   

   

 

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government was to become infinitely more difficult to forge than had been the case in the era of Megakles, Lykourgos and Peisistratos.30.

Herodotos tells us of Kleisthenes' reform of demoi and phylai;31 to this Aristotle adds some nomoi, of which he identifies only the one on ostracism.32 Kleisthenes disappears without a trace. He remains a mere shadow — which is in stark contrast to Herodotos' remarkable art of portrayal accorded many a Greek or barbarian. Could Herodotos actually have known more than the little he records? Kleisthenes seems to have been alive in the collective memory of the Athenians only in connexion with the abolishing of the old tribes and the creating of a new administrative order based on the demoi and the new ten phylai; he was also remembered as having played a major part in the rigmarole of Isagoras and Kleomenes, but only faintly and in a secondary sense. Rather than concentrate exclusively on the person of Kleisthenes and expend too much ingenuity on relatively minor problems (such as absolute chronology),33 I suggest that we lump together whatever innovative legislation was enacted from the return of Kleisthenes to 501/500 under the heading "Kleisthenic Reforms" and delineate the general thrust and spirit of reform in its immediate significance and in its far-reaching meaning. This will certainly do a greater service to the historical Kleisthenes (and to history) than will a personality-cult.

The actual implementation of the demoi-to-phylai laws may have been a long drawn-out affair. The enrolling of the citizens as demotai in the citizen lists in their demooi will have been a straightforward procedure.34 The process of establishing the trittyes and the phylai could have taken time (in view of the complexities by which generations of scholars have been kept busy). It would of course be anachronistic to think of an

 

   

   

 

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appointed or elected "commission" charged with carrying out the provisions of the new law; it is very likely, however, that a fair number of politically active and generally experienced men who had supported the new legislation now also became involved in ensuring its effective implementation. It would seem only too obvious that in the course of the actual "field-work" certain difficulties were encountered which, in due course, inspired modification. Such features would provide the explanation for the fact that the trittyes,35 though firmly established, were never to rise to such a degree of political significance as to equal that of the demoi and phylai.

The newly forged demoi-trittyes-phylai structure inaugurated the presence of a new Demos in a new Ekklesia; it necessitated aligning to it these bodies of government next to the Demos, namely, the Council and the military commanders of the Demos.36 It is significant, however, that not at this point attention was paid to the condition of both the Areios-Pagos-Council and the archonship.

Rhodes persuasively argued that the powers of the Kleisthenic Boule were the relatively minor ones of a probouleutic body, though the Council's "powers [were] not reduced [from those of the Solonian Council of Four-Hundred] but considerably increased".37 Rhodes also reaffirmed the attractive view that the first convening of the Council of Five-Hundred is contemporaneous with the Bouleutic Oath of (presumably) 501/500 with its clauses restricting the new powers of the new Boule.38 I find it difficult to regard the oath as "democratic"39 — yet it does constitute a measure of significance beyond that of simply

 

   

   

 

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implementing the Kleisthenic Reforms.40 Among the clauses which appear to belong to the archaic Bouleutic Oath41 we read one forbidding the incarceration of an Athenian citizen, if he is able to offer bond.42 This provision is strikingly reminiscent of the concerns of Kleisthenes: we recall, the decree passed in the archonship of Skamandrios,43 with its reassertion of the inviolable rights of the Athenian citizen; it also reflects the general tenor of all new legislation of that period: paramount concern in securing due process of law. This demonstrates that the spirit of reform and its main direction were still valiant forces at the end of the decade and the century, and after the disappearance of Kleisthenes (because of death, illness, or some other reason).

The strategia reform (to be in force in 501/500)44 also represents another step towards the logical extension of the demoi-trittyes-phylai structure,45 though it appears less easily explicable. Martin simply states46 that the phylai reform necessitated the reorganizing of the command structure below the archon polemarchos; that electing generals is no more democratic than electing archons; that he "does not see how one could attribute to it any particularly democratic significance".[46a] Surely, more can be said in justifying one's position.

From 501/500 on, to begin with, the number of elective chief officials of the State was double the earlier number (increased from nine to nineteen). Neither election nor sortition, however, are democratic by definition:it is context and intention that establish the true character of the procedure.47 Was the door now thrown wide open and were "democrats" recruited to the board of generals? First, it would appear logical that

 

   

   

 

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the strategoi as the commanders of the citizens' levy would have to own real estate.48 The timocratic qualifications which applied to the archonship may also have been invoked for the generalship — they were, at all events, implied: no ordinary individual could have afforded devoting one entire year's efforts to holding office without remuneration; the aristocratic exclusiveness of the strategia, if not explicitly spelt out, by these two qualifications was implicitly ensured. The first attested Athenian strategos, Melanthios, who led the Athenian contingent in Ionia, was a man TW=N A)STW=N TA\ PA/NTA DO/KIMOS.49

As for the actual procedure of election, there is no evidence: we are entirely dependent on speculation.50 I incline to think that candidates were preselected by the Boule according to phylai,51 where the councillors would of course have turned to honourable names from their own demos. The probable synchronism52 of Bouleutic Oath and strategia reform would thus be mutually corroborated.

The career of Melanthios, incidentally, may have become a precedent by showing that, irrespective of the question whether Melanthios did or did not expect to assume a prominent role at the time he set his sights on the generalship,53 one could more easily win the palm as a strategos abroad than as an archon at home: herein may lie the explanation as to why in this period archontes seem to have been persons of lesser distinction than we should like to expect.54

There is, then, little evidence to support the view that the strategia reform represented a determined effort to "democratize" Athenian

 

   

   

 

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politics. If in later ages the strategia did develop into a spring-board for demagogues and a characteristic institution of Athenian Democracy, it is by no means obvious that this would have been intended by the original amendment of 501.

Ostracism,55 finally, provides us with a characteristic example of a gesture which could also be turned into a "democratic" measure: it certainly had not been conceived as such by its originator. Ostracism does bear the familiar trade-mark of Kleisthenic Reform: it was designed to prevent the recurrence of an ugly feature of the Peisistratid past; judgement was to be passed by the Demos; due process of law is emphatically asserted. It is aristocratic interests, however, which it was to serve first and foremost — for it was the landed aristocrats who had suffered most from arbitrary exile-cum-dispossession.56 By guaranteeing usufructuary enjoyment of property and income thereof the new law protected the rights of those who played an important role in politics and society; who had in the past for this reason been exiled and dispossessed; who did have an estate in land. The original purpose of the law on ostracism in the context of Kleisthenic Reform was a protective one, and it was to protect aristocratic concerns. But it was badly thought out; it served best while left untouched in the scabbard — once implemented as a political weapon, however, it could only too easily be misused. It is, so far as I am aware, the only law in the Athenian constitution to fall into disrepute and finally into disuse, and one that never was emended.

We have reached the end of the period of the implementation and extension of the Kleisthenic work of reform. Not one of the measures we have surveyed can appropriately be termed "democratic" — neither individually nor in sum: they had issued from the immediate situation after the expulsion of the Peisistratids; they had been inspired by the personal experiences of their promoters among the aristocracy; they could be carried, and carried out, because the aristocratic consensus produced

 

   

   

 

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the majority of assembly votes which are needed under any constitution, unless the constitution is suspended by a tyrant or despot or by despotic oligarchy.

 

3.  The 490s.  —  The first decade of the fifth century is documented more poorly than the entire last third of the preceding century. The prosopographer finds little with which to occupy himself in this decade — unless he takes to inventing prosopa. We know the names of eleven figures of prominence: eight archons;57 one strategos;58 one tragic poet;59 one refugee-repatriate.60 The historian is equally disappointed, since facts are even fewer:Athenian participation in the sack of Sardis and subsequent withdrawal from Ionia;61 possibly some harbour construction in the archonship of Themistokles;62 the performance of a tragic play on the sack of Miletos and the fining of its author by the People's Assembly;63 Miltiades' narrow escape to Athens from his domain on the Thracian Chersonese, his prosecution and acquittal in a court of law of a charge of "tyranny" in the Chersonese, his election "by the Demos" as a strategos for 490/89.64 There is — significantly — no trace of further attempts at constitutional reform.

Attempts have been made to reconstruct the history of the 490s by conjuring up pictures of violent party-struggle; by inventing a tyrannist party and identifying its leader; by tracing the ups and downs of this party and the corresponding downs and ups of its opponents; by having the "Alkmeonids" involved in wheeling and dealing — is all this the most obvious, the simplest response to a rather simple challenge?65 Little has

 

   

   

 

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been recorded about these years, I suggest, because little worth recording happened.

Athens' role in the Ionian revolt fails to clarify matters. The decision to support the Ionians was a measure of foreign policy. Such decisions may, or may not, throw light on the issues and divisions in internal politics. The same clique and the same Assembly, which had promoted and voted in favour of intervention could without loss of face reverse its position. One can also think of any number of possible reasons of a totally non-political nature, which would deserve as much credence (and are equally unattested) as the pro-Persian pro-tyrant "party".66

Phrynichos' tragedy on the sack of Miletos67 is lost; we do not possess lines that are crucially significant for restoring the message of the playwright. The proverb PA/LAI POT' H)=SAN A)/LKIMOI *MILH/SIOI,68 however, runs like an iambic trimeter, and it has attractively been conjectured to be a verse from Phrynichos' play.69 I should prefer to think that Phrynichos was fined because he painted — in bad taste — an unflattering picture of the Milesians.70

Miltiades' return and re-entry into Athenian politics was caused by external forces and has therefore to be treated as a separate case. He was dragged before the courts by his echthroi, who remain anonymous71 — we must leave it at that: it would, however, have been a miracle in Greek politics if he had had no enemies. It is probable that his trial coincided with the ill-fated expedition of Mardonios against Greece;72 it gauged the mood of the people and his acquittal greatly strengthened the case of resistance. Miltiades, the grand old aristocrat and member of the Areios-Pagos-Council, obviously was popular enough with the masses and with a sufficient number of fellow nobles, who delivered the necessary number of votes to get him elected strategos. Miltiades had been watching ships go by the Chersonese during much of his lifetime; Miltiades also was the first

 

   

   

 

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Athenian to launch a major naval campaign into the Aegean. Themistokles, his junior by a whole generation, if he was the visionary promoter of a naval policy, would have been his ally — if not just a follower in his footsteps. Evidence for rivalry in 492/89 between these two men has yet to be produced.73

But is there not evidence to illuminate the political scene in the 490s to be gleaned from sources dealing with the second decade, which could be applied retroactively, as it were? According to the Ath. pol., it is true, the first three victims of ostracism were removed as OI( TW=N TURA/NNWN FI/LOI.74 Are we able to identify these "tyrants"? Now, Hippias, apart from being an ex-tyrant, was last seen coughing out his remaining tooth on the shore near Marathon;75 his soul will have left his (imaginary) E(/RKOS O)DO/NTWN soon after. His brother Hipparchos had been dead for a quarter of a century. Thessalos remains an unknown quantity. Of the grandsons of Peisistratos only Peisistratos son of Hippias is known to us; he would, if still alive, have been in his sixties.76 Neither the younger Peisistratos nor any other of the Peisistratids (who, according to Herodotos, accompanied Xerxes),77 however, could be called "tyrants" with any degree of

 

   

   

 

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accuracy. As a matter of fact, the Ath. pol. does not refer to particular "tyrants" — let alone to a treacherous pro-Peisistratid "party" in Athens the 490s. Was there perhaps nevertheless a "party" advocating tyranny? This is of course not impossible a priori. It would a priori, however, cancel out the alleged significance of the Peisistratid connexion of Hipparchos son of Charmos, archon eponymos in 496/95.78 The Persians, we remember, were firmly committed to bringing back to power the Peisistratid Hippias. There is no indication, furthermore, that they expected anything short of total subjection.79 An Athenian pro-tyrannical "party" would, in any event, have depended on outside forces for support80 — it is not easy to see from where; the Spartans had burnt their fingers badly, and after the congress in Sparta they would have had to go it alone, against the inclinations of their allies.81 In short, any theory that posits a tyrannist "party" operating at Athens in the 490s on the strength of the archonship of Hipparchos son of Charmos in 496/95 and his ostracism in 487, in conjunction with an interpreting remark in the Ath. pol., is open to serious logical challenge.

Finally, the events leading up to the battle of Marathon, and even the battle itself, fail to provide conclusive evidence as to the existence (let alone the strength) of a pro-tyrannical "party" of "traitors". There is not the slightest indication (however circumstantial) that at any point it was a topic of discussion whether or not the Persians should be resisted. It is to no one's surprise, however, that there was considerable debate on strategy. The arguments put into Miltiades' mouth by Herodotos82 in the former's bid to obtain the support of Kallimachos significantly play upon the theme of a change of mind of — not a certain "party" but the Athenians.83 Herodotos' silence is all the more important as it is he who at great length discusses the strange flashing of a shield after the battle.84 It furthermore

 

   

   

 

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appears that no attempt was made to pin the incident on Hipparchos, as we should have expected, had he been well up in the hierarchy of the tyrannist "party". The verdict in this case — as in the other instances which we investigated for evidence corroborating the all too familiar (and none too obvious) rigmarole of "parties" — reads: non liquet.

It appears probable, then, that the somewhat "mysterious" decade of the 490s was, on the whole, as quiet and "normal" as can be expected in Athenian politics; much more "normal", in fact, than the decades preceding and subsequent to the 490s, and perhaps any period in the fifth century. I find this answer entirely consistent with both the echo in the sources and internal developments up to 501/500. The aristocratically dominated State, efficiently restructured, devoted to the principle of due process of law and equal law for all, maintained by the politics of majority consensus, and under no serious threat from without, plainly worked well. The work of Kleisthenes and of his collaborators, allies and successors had proved a success — so far as success is possible in politics. Stasis as a means of attaining political power had been eliminated as effectively as had tyrannis as a form of government.

 

4.  The 480s.  —  In the autumn of 490 the Athenians fought back an attack of the Persians: in terms of World History perhaps no more than a minor skirmish85 — in the memory of the Athenians Marathon was one of their finest hours.86 The present mood of the Athenians was not one of

 

   

   

 

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awed anticipation and terror. Optimism87 prevailed over pessimism. [Few] Athenian[s] will have possessed the vision to foresee the destruction of the temples of the guardian gods88 who had saved them at Marathon, nor would he have commanded the power of persuasion to convince his fellow citizens of the impending doom. Evidence, both archaeological and historical, suggests this as a most viable assessment. On the Akropolis an archaic temple was pulled down to make room for a new temple of Athena; it was only half-finished by 480 and its scarred remains were subsequently built into the northern supporting wall or covered under the foundations of the Parthenon.89 Miltiades embarked on a naval expedition into the Aegean, conceived on a larger scale than anything hitherto.90 The false sense of security nearly seduced the Athenians into neglecting even their fleet — had it not been for the rhetorical power of the word of a Themistokles: newly gained income from a recently struck silver-vein came close to being distributed among the citizens as late as 483/82.91 Still in the same year the Athenians delivered another example of their preoccupation with matters that were trivial in comparison with the threat of renewed war with Persia: they decided to conduct another ostracism, after an intermission of two years.92

It is this general climate of optimism and confidence which we are able to sense in the years after Marathon, which manifests itself also in the

 

   

   

 

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archonship reform and the incipient application of the law on ostracism. This revived interest in constitutional matters seems to follow a pattern established by three closely parallel occasions since the termination of tyranny: (1) after the departure of the Peisistratids — the so-called Diapsephismos and the decree outlawing torture; (2) following the repelling of Isagoras and his royal Spartan ally — the reform act by which the demoi-administration, trittyes and phylai were created; (3) subsequent to the Athenian victory in the war on three fronts — the Bouleutic Oath and the strategia-reform.[92a] In each instance, however, reform was of course not enacted for its own sake; nor was it implemented in order to serve as an individual move in a series of steps towards accomplishing some broadly conceived vision of the form of government of the future: the causes in each case stemmed from the more particular problems of the more immediate past and the present: the intention was to "do something about it."

The Ath. pol. (22,5) alone records and dates the archonship-reform. Let me first restate views previously expressed by other scholars regarding several attendant points of detail: (1) I accept the conjecture that the transferring of the presidency of the Ekklesia from the archon eponymos to the prytaneis93 and the transferring of certain responsibilities of the archon polemarchos from that archon to the strategoi94 both belong to the same context of the archonship-reform, since in this way the archonship was rendered more homogeneous; (2) I accept the suggestion that the secretary to the thesmothetai by the same act became a position to be filled by the same procedure as the nine archontes from among the same body of candidates,95 so that each of the ten phylai had one man from their fellow tribesmen chosen by the lot under the new procedure.

Let me now briefly state my own view concerning two additional attendant points of detail: (3) 1 believe that it was Telesinos who (together with his colleagues and the secretary) was the first archon eponymos to be selected under the emended two-stage procedure (of prokrisis and sortition), to serve his term in 487/86;96 (4) since I accept the reservations of many

 

   

   

 

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scholars as to the credibility — or even feasibility — of the figure of five hundred preselected candidates for the choice by the lot to become archon,97 I propose the following emended reading of the text of Ath. pol. 22,5:98

[AP
22,5]

On the subject of sortition about all that can be said was actually said by Martin: "Das Los hat jedoch zunächst nichts mit Demokratie, sondern nur etwas mit Gleichheit zu tun".99 He also very aptly points out that it was not in 487 that the archonship was thrown open to lower-rated revenue earners.100 It is the principle of equality among the nobles, therefore, which adumbrates the significance in 487 of the introduction of sortition into the selection-process for the archonship.

This gesture of sortition, however (and moreover), was restricted to the second step. The principle of preselection for the first step indeed reinforces the aristocratic character of the reform: by choosing the candidates in the Boule, whose members were accountable to their noble demotai (and presumably their demarchoi) back in their own demoi, the influence of the nobles could be brought to bear much more strongly than

 

   

   

 

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under the old arrangement. The use of the bean surely did not signify "people power" — not in 487, in any event.

Until 487 the archontes were not selected in accordance with the essential elements of the Kleisthenic administration of Attica. This incongruity now disappears. The demoi are introduced as the primary partner in the selection of the archontes — with the Boule acting as their intermediary. We remember how in all reform since the creation of the demoi-administration the demoi-structure was the basis and the starting point. By allowing the demoi to participate in a significant manner by having candidates chosen who are as representative of all villages of Attica as are the members of the Boule, the institution of the archonship was rendered infinitely more representative of Attica in all its diversity than it ever was before 487. This particular point was further strengthened by sortition KATA\ FULA/S: from now on all phylai are represented equally by providing not only one general each, but also one archon each.101

What were the effects of the archonship reform on other (already existing) bodies of government? The transfer of the presidency of the People's Assembly to the Boule of Five-Hundred; the assigning of the task of preselecting "suitable" candidates for their "beaning" to become archontes;102 these measures were presumably not intended as major changes at that time: they do herald the direction which developments will eventually take, namely, the ever growing potential status of the Boule of Five-Hundred in the political field, to the point at which it is indeed capable of performing in that coup d'état which eliminated the Areios-Pagos-Council from politics. At this point (487), however, a clear intent is anything but obvious.

Let us now examine whether the archonship reform — apart from arming the Boule of Five-Hundred with political potential of eventually far-reaching consequences — also infringed on, upheld, or otherwise affected existing institutions. In 490 the archon polemarchos still acted as a

 

   

   

 

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hegemon of the Athenian hoplite phalanx; he was the commander of its right wing; his vote could decide the debate among the plenary assembly of the ten generals.103 By 479 he has dropped out of sight, leaving behind a strategia stripped of its leader: ten generals — ten individuals.104 In 490 the People's Assembly had dispatched its generals to Marathon to fight the enemy — surely not to sit around and debate if they should fight.105 Had the archon polemarchos (Kallimachos) elected to cast his vote against the counsel to fight (attributed to Miltiades),106 there would not have been a "Battle of Marathon" . . .: it plainly runs counter to the spirit of the Kleisthenic State that one man alone should be in a position to decide on a matter of the gravest national importance; that the State should be put at the mercy of the wits of a single individual. Come 480, however, little is heard of the strategoi.107 They issued, it is true, a proclamation so profound as to advise that everyone look out for himself: they were (as Aristotle nicely comments)108 at their wit's end. Immediately after Marathon in 489 Miltiades109 was sent out on a naval expedition with powers interpreted by Miltiades to include authority to return as he saw fit, without having secured any booty or accomplished anything; he was duly prosecuted and tried (by the People's Assembly sitting as a court of law).110 Immediately after Plataiai in 479 Xanthippos and his co-generals

 

   

   

 

— 220 —

 

stuck to the order of the Assembly, scrupulously and to the letter. They flatly refused — in spite of their soldiers' (their fellow citizens) urgent representations — to raise the siege of Sestos and sail home, unless they were recalled by the Assembly.111

Does it require a vivid imagination to discern a pattern in all this? To me the conclusion suggests itself that the strategia, by its problematical performance during the preceding thirteen years, had exposed itself as deficient. The generals had to become more directly accountable for their actions under the principle of due process of law and more strictly subjected to the orders of the People. Transgressions would be tried in the Areios-Pagos-Council or by the People's Assembly.112

The Areios-Pagos-Council, finally, was also affected by the archonship reform of 487. Since the archons continued to join the ranks of that Council, all that was stated about the archonship becomes true of the Areios-Pagos-Council. This body too only now became aligned with the Kleisthenic system of administration. It had obtained a new lease on life. It would become truly representative of the Attic nobility: a mere decade later (when the so-called Kimonian era only begins) as much as a third of the entire membership of the Areios-Pagos-Council may already have gone through the pre-selection procedure in that other Council, namely, the Kleisthenic Boule of Five-Hundred which already represented all the demoi of Attica. In 462 only very few men on the Areios-Pagos-Council can have been left from those who had entered it before 486. Aristotle may after all be right in suggesting that there was a period during which the Areios-Pagos-Council regained its strength and was able to assert its ascendancy by "running the City"113 — it was an Indian summer which

 

   

   

 

— 221 —

 

could not last very long; and it may be historic irony that the councillors who gathered on the Areios Pagos had to be pre-selected by the councillors of the People. At any rate, Aischylos' Eumenides would carry a much stronger message against the background of a strong Areios-Pagos-Council that had only four years earlier fallen victim to a "Staatsstreich".

I accordingly judge the destruction of the Areios-Pagos-Council not to be a consequence or extension of the archonship reform — dying a slow death over a period of a quarter of a century with Ephialtes administering only a long overdue coup de grâce. The Areios-Pagos-Council did not die a natural death. It was assassinated.

The reduction of the archonship to insignificance does not occur in 487 — quite the contrary: it is in consequence of the destruction of the Areios-Pagos-Council of 462 that in 457 the first zeugites enters office as archon eponymos. The archonship too now lost its aristocratic prestige.114

The archonship reform of 487 was a major reform, if somewhat different in meaning and intent from its traditional presentation. It partly represents a further extension of the Kleisthenic reforms, aligning archonship and Areios-Pagos-Council with the Kleisthenic demoi-administration and thereby re-valuing both the archonship and (in particular) the Areios-Pagos-Council, while de-valuing the strategia. It is not possible to detect any intent to democratize, nor any concept of democracy, in this reform.

If the new law could be applied to select the archons for 487/86 by the two-stage procedure it provided for, it must have been passed before the end of the archon-year 488/87. The final stages of the debate on the archonship reform coincided with the vote in the early spring of 487 to conduct an ostracism for the first time.115 I do not believe that as yet we know enough about the meaning of the ostracisms of the 480s116 — Plutarch may indeed provide the proper answer: he tells of an illiterate peasant who could not stand Aristeides' being called "the Just"117 — an utterly unpolitical "offence". This is not the place to plunge into yet another discourse on ostracism:118 let me just state that in my judgement the familiar rigmarole of "parties" of all shades, ranging from pro-Persian and pro-Peisistratid to anti-

 

   

   

 

— 222 —

 

Persian, anti-Peisistratid, anti-tyrannical, and even radical-democratic, with the "Alkmeonids" conveniently mixed in here and there, surely has yet to find corroborating evidence — this neither the ostracisms119 nor the ostraka120 are apt to produce. Until such evidence surfaces we had better relegate all this to the ghost-house of anachronistic historiography.

 

5.  The Emergence of Athenian Democracy.  —  We must not, I suggest in conclusion, attempt to schematize or systematize Athenian politics to match and satisfy our own political idiosyncrasies. We are dealing with a disorderly, chaotic world. We have no right to restore it to its "true", "original" state of neat order and simplicity by imposing on it patterns which are alien to it. The Ancient World is a foreign one. It is a strange world. Athens is no exception.

The democracy which we idolize was unknown. The peculiar form of government and administration which we describe as Athenian Democracy was neither born, nor improved, between 510 and 480 B.C. Yet this quarter of a century is a period of great significance. It is an era of transition from archaic tyranny, [120a] to classical democracy. In the Kleisthenic State the aristocratic principles of equality and due process of law became

 

   

   

 

— 223 —

 

the prime commitments of government. By creating the demoi-structure a broadly based system of administration was accomplished. It is a period, therefore, not only of transition, but one in which the foundations were laid.

It is a different generation, however, to which we must turn to witness the actual birth and development of democracy at Athens — in an enlightened world which owes its radiance to the meteoric rise of intellectual individualism; in which the scientific and artistic disciplines break loose from the fetters of the Archaic Age. It is due to this rapid acceleration of the evolution of the Greek mind (tolling the bell for the aristocratic age) that the Athenian Example becomes possible. The intellectual stagnation into which the Classical World was soon to relapse might never have been broken — had it not been stirred by enlightenment. Athens, as its focal point, owes a great debt to the entire Greek world.

Where did democracy rise? When did democracy rise? At Athens, we should answer — as it emerged as the catalyst of Greek intellectualism (and imperialism). In the political arena the names that instantly spring to mind are Ephialtes . . ., Perikles . . . — but in the same instant we should be equally reminded that in the wider field of Geistesgeschichte politicians occupy but a small corner: reflecting change more often than initiating it.121

 

   

   

 

Footnotes

 

*     Friderico Schachermeyr magistro optimo amico D.D.D.

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1     Most of the material incorporated in this study was read at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Association of Ancient Historians (May 1975). I am especially grateful to Professor Martin Ostwald and to Dr E. F. Bloedow; their criticism was invaluable in preparing that paper. I am also grateful to many colleagues from whose criticism I benefited (in the formal discussion and in private conversation), and in particular to Professors A. Andrewes, E. Badian, C.W. Fornara, A.J. Podlecki, A.E. Raubitschek, M.E. White, and Dr E. Kluwe, who all put me in their debt by communicating to me their criticism of various contentions put forward in my presentation. They are of course in no way responsible for the contents of the present contribution (nor should their agreement be inferred).

[Also available in a German translation by the author: "Athen: Zwischen Tyrannis und Demokratie", in: K.H. Kinzl (ed.), Demokratia: Der Weg zur Demokratie bei den Griechen (1985) 213-247.]

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2     E. Badian, "Archons and Strategoi", Antichthon 5 (1971) 1-34 (I am grateful to Prof. Badian for an offprint).

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3     ["The democracy was in Athens the result not of deliberate action aimed at establishing a democracy",] J.Martin, "Von Kleisthenes zu Ephialtes: Zur Entstehung der Athenischen Demokratie", Chiron 4 (1974) 5-42 (I am grateful to Dozent Martin for an offprint); the quotation is from p .40. [Now also in: Demokratia (see n. 1), 161-212; quotation on p. 210.]

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4     This poses certain problems of presentation, since some historical peripeteiai may be best interpreted by later events (my view regarding the intended purpose of ostracism [see 209], for example, is crucially significant to the development of my ideas presented in Section One). It has been my desire throughout not to get caught up in minutiae. I have attempted to detect a general pattern, according to which every detail would eventually fall into place. My reconstruction will, I suggest, have to be replaced in toto if I should have seen things the wrong way.

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5     The term "was used technically for the E)CE/TASIS TW=N POLITW=N H( KATA\ DH/MOUS GINOME/NH,... for the regular entering of the sons of citizens into the LHCIARXIKO\N GRAMMATEI=ON", as well as for "extraordinary scrutinies" (Jacoby, FGrHist 3b Suppl. Text, 157,35ff.); see Hesych. 1474 DIAYH/FISIS (1, 447 Latte); cf. Ath. pol. 42,1, where the Verb DIAYHFI/ZEIN applies to the regular practice of oath-taking of the demotai at the occasion of enrolling free-born Athenians upon their reaching maturity. The only Diapsephismos which constituted an extraordinary scrutiny and which is "historically certain" (Jacoby, op. cit., 157,33f.) was performed in 346/45. Aristotle's use of this particular term in a late-sixth-century context not surprising, since the Ath. pol. (at least in its historical survey) is loaded with anachronistic terminology and interpretation. The remark in the Ath. pol. does confirm, however, that its author found in his sources something which lent itself to anachronistic interpretation: that certain events occurred immediately after the expulsion of the Peisistratids which affected the legal status of some Athenian residents; and that these had not been forgotten by the collective memory of the Athenians.

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6     See Ath. pol. 13,5.

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7     This is implied by the ambiguous nature of the procedure of the Diapsephismos.

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8     In support of this conclusion I cite: (a) the reference to neopolitai at Ath. pol. 21,4; (b) Aristotle's curious remark in pol. 1275 b 36: . . . *KLEISQE/NHS META\ TH\N TW=N TURA/NNWN E)KBOLH/N: POLLOU\S GA\R E)FULE/TEUSE CE/NOUS KAI\ DOU/LOUS METOI/KOUS. The verb FULETEU/W is rare (no other passages are cited in LSJ9). It is closely paralleled by the verb DHMOTEU/ESQAI (LSJ9 cite Lysias, Antiphon, Demosthenes). Fourth-century citizenship decrees refer (without exception, as far s I could ascertain) to all three jurisdictions: phyle, demos, phratria (IG2 2-3, 4, 1, p. 55 [index], POLITEI/A). In his description of the ephebic procedure (Ath. pol. 42), Aristotle naturally begins with the doings in the demoi. Why did Aristotle use the unusual verb (in spite of his tending towards the opposite type of anachronism)? I can only assume: because he realized that (immediately after the expulsion of the tyrants) citizenship as still conferred by enrolling people in one of the ancient four phylai (before the demoi had assumed the key role in administering citizenship — DHMOTEU/ESQAI).

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9     Andok. 1 Myst. 43. Cf. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (1969) 140 — who also dates the "revival" of the "Draconian Law", "under which anyone attempting or abetting the establishment of a tyranny at Athens was declared an outlaw" (loc. cit.) — together with the stele mentioned at Thuk. 6,55,1f. in the same context. Ostwald does not, however, recognize Kleisthenes as the moving force behind all this. (On Athenian legislation against tyranny see Ostwald, TAPhA 86 (1955) 103-128.)

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10     T.J. Cadoux, JHS 68 (1948) 113; cf. Ostwald, Nomos, 141.

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11     This [becomes evident] from Hdt. (pace Aristotle's understanding of Hdt., Ath. pol. 20,1). In Hdt. 5,66,2 we read that O( *KLEISQE/NHS TO\N DH=MON PROSETAIRI/ZETAI. The same verb occurs in only two more places (3,70,2 and 3,70,3). There Otanes proceeds in his conspiratorial plans against the Pseudo-Bardiya by first acquiring (PARALABW/N, 3,70,1) Aspathines and Gobryes; next the three decide E(/KASTON A)/NDRA *PERSE/WN PROSETAIRI/SASQAI TOU=TON O(/TEW| PISTEU/EI MA/LISTA; accordingly Otanes acquires (E)SA/GETAI, 3,70,2) Intaphrenes, Gobryes Megabyxos, and Aspathines Hydarnes; these six then resolve KAI\ TO\N DAREI=ON PROETAIRI/SASQAI (3,70,3). None of these men would have been desirable acquisitions had they not commanded a considerable following among their subjects. In the case of Kleisthenes the required massive following could only be delivered by their noble leaders. The two passages display, as it were, two sides of one and the same coin — omitting the figures of the leaders at 5,66,2 (perhaps simply because — Hdt. did not know their names), while omitting the mass of the followers of the leaders at 3,70,2f. Ostwald, Nomos, 143, clearly realizes the problem but unnecessarily separates the people from their aristocratic leaders: Kleisthenes "made the people that which his aristocratic E(TAI=ROI had been before, namely, the main source of his political support". Hdt., incidentally, makes it plain that he does not envisage anything of the kind Aristotle infers from the verb PROSETAIRI/ZOMAI by alternating it with PROSTI/QESQAI (5,69,2), PARALAMBA/NEIN (3,70,1) and E)SA/GESQAI (3,70,2), as if they were synonymous. On the corresponding meaning of demos at Hdt. 5,66,2 and 5,69,2 see my study in Gymnasium 85 (1978) 117ff.; 312ff. [also in English translation: 117ff.; 312ff.]

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12     Cf. Ostwald, Nomos, 144.

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13     Hdt. 5,66-73; cf. Ath. pol. 20. Note esp. Hdt. 5,72,2, explicitly stating that it was the followers of the men in the Boule (aristocrats no doubt), the commoners, that is, who enabled the Council to resist. One may also venture to guess that it was the sheer efficacy of that Boule with men (leaders and followers) from many of the villages which counted among the factors that inspired the demoi reform.

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14     B.D. Meritt, Hesperia 8 (1939) 59ff.; SEG 10 no. 352; cf. D.W. Bradeen, Hesperia 32 (1963) 187ff. and plates 58f.

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15     Kleisthenes was in fact appointed thesmothetes by Busolt (Griech. Gesch. 22, 402), or archon eponymos for 509/08; cf. Schachermeyr, Klio 25 (1932) 335 = Forschungen und Betrachtungen zur griechischen und römischen Geschichte (1975) 61, against these attempts.

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16     E.g. Alkibiades (Isokr. 16,25; PA no. 597; Davies, Athenian Propertied Families (1971) 15); Kallias ([Hdt.] 6,122; PA no. 1833; Davies, op. cit., 255f.); Leogoras (Andok. 1 Myst. 106; PA no. 9074; Davies, op. cit., 27f.).

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17     If the situation of the Little Man deteriorated after the Good Old Days of the Old Tyrant, it would have been at least as much because of the discord among the nobles after liberation from tyranny as it was because of Peisistratid despotism. The diminished stature of Athens in foreign policy weakened her foreign trade; movement of aliens to Athens decreased; the absence or even dispossession of aristocratic leaders throughout Attica disrupted farming, trade and commerce. For these measures did not signify social reform, but constituted plain acts of vengeance. If the situation of the nobles improved, so would that of th commoners.

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18     Hdt. 5,62f.; cf. Hermes 102 (1974) 179-190, and esp. RhM 118 (1975) 193ff.

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19     Thus, for instance, E. Ruschenbusch, Gnomon 43 (1971) 414-416 (review of Ostwald, Nomos).

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20     Cf. A.R.W. Harrison, The Law of Athens, 2 (1971) 205-207. See also the excellent observations of D.M. Lewis, Historia 12 (1963) 38 (cf. also 35, and A. Andrewes, JHS 81 (1961) 13f.).

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21     Cf. R. Sealey, Historia 9 (1960) 155-180 = Essays in Greek Politics, 9-38.

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22     Cf. S. Solders, Die außerstädtischen Kulte und die Einigung Attikas (1931).

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23     Cf. still J. Toepffer, Attische Genealogie (1889; repr. 1973).

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24     Cf. D.M. Lewis, Historia 12 (1963) 37 (Kleisthenes "had learnt ...").

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25     It must be stressed that complex reform surely cannot start at the top of the structure, but must begin at its base: the demoi, that is. The demoi reform was the first step, the demoi are the fundament of all further reform. Cf. the remarks of D.M. Lewis, Historia 12 (1963) 38.

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26     Aristot. pol. 1319 b 26; Ath. pol. 21,1 and 3 (it is to the credit of Hdt. that he does not know anything of all this).

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27     See V. Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates2 (1973) 411 n. 34 on "theories ... of an exact chronology of the events". Hdt. 5,66 and 69, and Aristot. Ath. pol., 20f. are reconciled in the interpretations of Schachermeyr, Klio 25 (1932) 345 = Forschungen, 71; H.T. Wade-Gery, CQ 27 (1933) 17-19 = Essays in Greek History (1958) 136ff.; Ostwald, Nomos, 142ff. Hdt. and his defenders would be vindicated if the first dithyrambic agon (MP, FGrHist 239 A 46), which was a contest of phylic choroi, could be shown to have been performed by ten choroi in early 508 (on the date see Cadoux, op. cit. [n. 10], 113). [Cf. also Klio 62 (1980) 186 etc.; cf. English trans.]

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28     It appears now as generally agreed that Kleisthenes did not establish exactly one hundred demoi (pace Bengtson, Griech. Gesch.4, 144); cf. Schachermeyr, Die frühe Klassik der Griechen (1966) 69; Ehrenberg, op. cit., 411 n. 36; J.S. Traill, The Political Organization of Attica (Hesperia Supplement 14) (1975) 96ff.

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29     I follow the view that demoi consisted of people and were not defined by boundaries drawn on a map, as territorial units: Ehrenberg, op. cit., 92 and 411 n. 35a,; Traill, op. cit., 73f. with n. 6; W.E. Thompson, SO 46 (1971) 72-79; all against C.W.J. Eliot, The Coastal Demes of Attica (Phoenix Supplement 5) (1962).

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30     If several closely related oikoi of one and the same genos came to be enlisted different demoi (with different local concerns and identities), this (I should surmise) would have been an act by which the power and influence of the one chief exponent of each genos was reduced as much as it is alleged to have increased his political strength; see Bicknell, Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy (Historia Einzelschriften 19) (1972) 1-53 (who thinks that this was Kleisthenes' clever way of packing the Boule with "Alkmeonids": it seems somewhat surprising that this went undetected in his own time and later).

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31     Hdt. 5,66,2; 5,69,2; 6,131,1; cf. Ath. pol. 21,2-6.

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32     Ath. pol. 22,1.

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33     Cf. n. 27.

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34     See W.E. Thompson, op. cit. (n. 28), 75f., against C.W.J. Eliot, op. cit. (n. 29), 148 with n. 18. There may have been some cases of doubtful citizenship despite — or because of — the so-called Diapsephismos. In the face of storm-clouds gathering [in] all [directions] it ought to have been carried out swiftly, in order to have a citizens' army undivided by discord.

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35     Cf. on the trittyes D.W. Bradeen, TAPhA 86 (1955) 22-30; D.M. Lewis, Historia 12 (1963) 34ff.

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36     On these measures cf. the recent monographs: Traill, op. cit. (n. 28); Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (1972); C.W. Fornara, The Athenian Board of Generals From 501 to 404 (Historia Einzelschriften 16) (1971).

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37     Rhodes, op. cit., 206; for the opposite view see, e.g., Bicknell, op. cit. (n. 30), 36.

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38     Rhodes, op. cit. (n. 36), 210; the clauses are conveniently accessible in Rhodes, 194 (with detailed discussion, 190-199). The date hinges on that of the archonship of Hermokreon (Ath. pol. 22,2); 504/03 would be an alternative possibility. See Cadoux, (n. 10), 115f. One of the chief attractions of the synchronism (and therefore of the political connexion) of the introduction of the Bouleutic Oath and the inauguration of bouleutic routine work is that it neatly eliminates the disturbing question as to why, after only a few years of existence, the Council of Five-Hundred needed a new charter (cf. for an example of such hypothesizing R.A. de Laix, Probouleusis at Athens (University of California Publications in History 83) (1973) 21-25). Cf. Kinzl, op. cit. (n. 11).

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39     It is not an unequivocal recommendation that Demosthenes (24 Tim. 48) refers to it as "Solonian" (despite late-fifth-century accretions).

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40     "Eine einfache Vollzugsnahme der kleisthenischen Reformen" (Martin, op. cit. [n. 3], 23 [= 186]).

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41     We should like to know more about the degree of authenticity and the date of the Heliastic Oath, which explicitly refers to Boule and Demos (quoted by Demosth. 24,149f. — immediately after his reference to the Bouleutic Oath).

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42     Demosth. 24,144.

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43     See above 200f. with n. 10.

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44     This date implies that the political and constitutional manoeuvres leading up to the first-ever election of the ten strategoi for 501/500 took place over an unknown period of time, to come to a conclusion in early 501 at the latest. If the first formal session of the Council of Five-Hundred falls the same year 501/500, this raises interesting questions of a procedural kind: what was the role of the Areios-Pagos-Council and of the People's Assembly relative to each other; did the old Council of Four-Hundred still function? No answer offers itself readily, so that we had better relegate it to the realm of speculation. Cf., however, Kinzl, op. cit. (n. 11).

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45     Cf. Fornara, op. cit. (n. 36), 1-10.

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46     Martin, op. cit. (n. 3), 23f. (in six-and-a-half lines) [= 186].

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[46a     Loc. cit.: "Ich sehe deshalb nicht, wie man den Maßnahmen von 501/0 eine besondere demokratische Bedeutung beilegen kann".]

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47     Cf. Martin 26f.

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48     That much is suggested, in fact, by Deinarchos (1,71); his statement is accepted by Hignett, Hist. Ath. Const., 191f. with n. 7; 224 n. 10.

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49     Hdt. 5,97,3.

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50     The vexed question of "Double Representation" fortunately does not affect our argument. On the strategia cf. Fornara, op. cit. (n. 36); N.G.L. Hammond, CQ 19 (1969) 111-144 = Studies in Greek History (1973) 346-394; M. Piérart, BCH 98 (1974) 125-146.

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51     Cf. A.H.M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (1957) 127, with 159 n. 161; Bicknell, op. cit. (n.30), 104 and esp. 105. I posit the same procedure for the archons, see below 216ff. with n. 97-102.

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52     See above 206.

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53     The name is not connected in any of our sources with one of the famous oikiai. If he was also involved in drafting the legislation setting up the board of generals, as is not improbable, we should have another indication [of] the "aristocratic" character of the reforms (see Hdt. 5,97,3, quoted in the text). There are three ostraka of a Melanthios Phalanthou; one of Phalanthos Spintharou; one of Spintharos Eu[boulou Probalinthios?]; see Meiggs & Lewis p. 46; Thomsen, op. cit. (n. 55), 77ff. Is there any connexion with the tragedian Melanthios (TrGF 23 Melanthios 1, esp. T 1 a-b = Plut. Kimon, 4,1; 9)?

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54     The starting point of Badian's arguments, op. cit. (n. 2).

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55     On the ostracisms of the 480s see below [221f.]. There is no point in rehearsing the merciless and unabated outpour of studies on this particular institution.

A solid survey of the situation in early 1969: E. Vanderpool, "Ostracism at Athens", Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, 2nd Series (1973 215-270. Very serviceable: R. Thomsen, The Origin of Ostracism: A Synthesis (Humanitas 4) (1972) (158 pp.).

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56     Known cases: see n. 16. The "new capitalists" should always have been able to flee with enough cash stuffed in their boots — it must have been an entirely different matter for the old landed families, especially for those who had not been in a position to enrich themselves at the invitation of Kroisos.

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57     Cadoux, op. cit. (n. 10), 116f.; D.M. Lewis, CR 12 (1962) 201. Fornara's challenge of Themistokles' archonship 493/92, Historia 20 (1971) 534-540, was rejected by D.M. Lewis, Historia 22 (1973) 757f. and W.W. Dickie, Historia 22 (1973) 758f.

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58     Melanthios, Hdt. 5,97,3.

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59     See n. 63; n. 68f.

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60     See n. 64.

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61     Hdt. 5,97-103,2.

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62     Thuk. 1,93,3. Cf. Fornara, op. cit. (n. 57) and Dickie, op. cit. (n. 57). J.S. Boersma, Athenian Building Policy from 561/0 to 405/4 B.C. (Scripta Archaeologica Groningiana), 4 (1970) 37; Podlecki, The Life of Themistocles (1975) 179ff. (I am grateful to Professor Podlecki for generously providing photostats of several pages in advance of publication.)

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63     Hdt. 6,21,2. Lesky, Die Tragische Dichtung der Hellenen3 (1972) 60. Badian, op. cit. (n. 2), 15 n. 44, would remove the incident from the 490s altogether.

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64     Hdt. 6,41; 6,104,2. Cf. Kinzl, Miltiades-Forschungen (1968) passim; Hermes 104 (1976) 287.

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65     Cf. Badian, op. cit. (n. 2) passim. I am taking the liberty of passing over the relevant bibliography in silence.

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66     E.g. problems of communication between Athens and her general (or generals?) in Ionia (this is the first instance since the Trojan War that an Athenian armada landed in Asia Minor); a conflict of personalities between Melanthios and Aristagoras; Athenian elation (and bad judgement) after the burning of Sardis; despondenc[e] after the defeat at Ephesos; sudden timidity — and so forth.

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67     If it belongs here at all: see Badian (n. 63).

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68     Souda *P 61 (Lexicogr. Gr. 1, 4, 8, 12 Adler); Synes. ep. 80,228D; Pseudo-Zenob. 5,80 (Corp. Paroem. Gr. 1, 152).

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69     B. Schmid, Studien zu griechischen Ktisissagen (1947) 187 n. 1.

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70     Cf. Hdt.' curious remarks about Kleisthenes' alleged anti-Ionianism at 5,69,2 [cf. Kinzl, Klio 62 (1980) 188; English trans.].

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71     Hdt. 6,104,2; cf. n. 64. It would be idle speculation to "identify" these echthroi.

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72     Hdt. 6,43-45; 6,94,2.

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73     Pace Plut. Them. 4,5 = Stesimbrotos FGHist 107 F 3. Podlecki, op. cit. (n. 62), 58 (cf. 203) would substitute Aristeides, not improbably. Stesimbrotos' statement was defended recently by Schachermeyr, "Stesimbrotos und seine Schrift über die Staatsmänner", SAWW 247 (1965) 5. Abh., 13 = Forschungen und Betrachtungen, 161. No evidence can be obtained from Ath. pol. 28,2, which does not square with Ath. pol. 41,2, nor with its own words; at any rate, Miltiades is coupled with Xanthippos and Themistokles with Aristeides in 28,2 (the latter appearing with Ephialtes [who faces Kimon the son of Miltiades in 28,2] at 41,2), as already before (23,3).

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74     Ath. pol. 22,4 and 6. (On the ostracisms of the 480s see below 221f.). The phraseology is clearly anachronistic. The term would be applicable under fourth-century conditions, to denounce men who oppose democratic government and who naturally favour, and are being favoured by, tyrants in other Greek cities. We know of no Greek tyrannies of this age outside Greater Greece or (possibly) Greek cities under Persian rule (cf., however, Hdt. 6,43,3 [where demokratia means only freedom from a violent despot, but not "democracy"; see Kinzl, op. cit. (n. 11)]). Isagoras is also styled "friend of the tyrants", Ath. pol. 20,1, presumably on the basis of Hdt. 5,74,1 (Kleomenes' last attempt at intervening in Athenian affairs, *I)SAGO/RHN BOULO/MENOS TU/RANNON KATASTH=SAI). Gomme has seen nearly all of this more than thirty years ago (More Essays, 27f.).

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75     Hdt. 6,107,3.

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76     See Davies, op. cit. (n. 16), 446ff.; cf. Historia 22 (1973) 504-507.

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77     Hdt. 7,6; 8,52. I am not quite certain what Hdt. meant to say (if anything). In 480, only longeval sons of the makrobios Hippias, or some great-grandsons of he Old Tyrant who had never seen Athens in their lives, cold have been in the camp of Xerxes. The point is perhaps irrelevant — were it not for its demonstrating our relative ignorance and the strict limitations on the results of prosopographical attempts.

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78     Often interpreted as a move to "appease" Persia.

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79     These considerations seem compelling enough to rule out, a priori, the "appeasement" theory.

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80     From the first reported attempt at usurpation on (Kylon), through the entire sixth century; failure to ensure such outside support only ensured failure (e.g. Damasias, it appears) — while the opposite of course could not guarantee success (Isagoras, for instance, and Hippias and his folk after 510).

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81     Hdt. 5,90ff. (Kleomenes might by then have begun to drink his wine undiluted.)

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82     Hdt. 6,109,3-6, reflecting his own thoughts and knowledge (or ignorance): RhM 118 (1975) 200.

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83     This has the definite ring of a doublet: see Hdt. 9,11,2 (no doubt a historical fact), which seems to have been his source of inspiration for this particular twist in Miltiades' argument (which seems rather an insult to the intelligence of the polemarchos).

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84     Hdt. 6,115; 121-124.

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85     "Marathonology" has produced a vast bibliography to which more is constantly being added. (Its relative position in the context of the history of that age is sometimes lost Sight of; cf., however, Schachermeyr, "Marathon und die persische Politik", HZ 172 (1955) 1-35 = Forschungen und Betrachtungen, 85-119.) Excavations such as those conducted by the late Spyridon Marinatos (see A.R. Burn, in: Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean ... (1977) 91f.) are necessary. But above all, the sources must be sorted out once and for all. The painting in the Stoa poikile is the prime and ultimate source of the literary tradition (on the painting see E.B. Harrison, "The South Frieze of the Nike Temple and the Marathon Painting in the Painted Stoa", AJA 76 (1972) 353ff., with a collection of the testimonia for the painting, 370-378; cf. also T. Hölscher, Griechische Historienbilder des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. (Beiträge zur Archäologie 6) (1973) 38-84; esp. 50ff.), a distorted one from the outset — to which further distortion was added according to the tastes, needs, or dislikes of each respective author (this may even include observations on the terrain in later ages, perhaps from autopsy). Here I venture to append this question: why is it that the Athenian fleet (numbering no less than seventy, see Hdt. 6,132; they cannot all have been transport vessels, cf. Hdt. 6,41,1-2) — with rare consistency among our sources (and their modern counterparts) — is at least as XWRI/S as the notorious I(PPEI=S of the invaders?

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86     Theopompos of course found reason to fulminate against this stereotypically misrepresentative boasting of the Athenians (FGHist 115 F 153; cf., on the meaning of this fragment, my suggestion Gymnasium 81 (1974) 314 n. 1). Cf., incidentally, Thuk. 1,73.

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87     On the concept of "Frühklassischer" or "Klassischer Optimismus" cf. Schachermeyr, Die frühe Klassik der Griechen (1966) index s.v.; Perikles,(1969) esp. 24 ff. and 195ff.; Geistesgeschichte der Perikleischen Zeit (1971) 17 etc.; the same works also on the "Generation der Marathon-Kämpfer".

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88     In retaliation, Hdt. tells us (5,102), for the burning of the sanctuary of Kybebe at Sardis.

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89     Cf. Boersma, op. cit. (n. 62), 38f. I owe this particular point to Professor C.W.J. Eliot (lecture at Trent University in March 1974). See J. Travlos, Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens (1971) 444ff.

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90     Hdt. 6,132ff. On the ancient accounts see my paper "Miltiades' Parosexpedition in der Geschichtsschreibung", Hermes 104 (1976) 280-307.

Scope and aims of the expedition are contentious; I incline to think that the Athenians knew its general thrust and direction; that Paros was only the first major step and, as the gods willed it, the terminal point of the campaign and its leader's career and even his life. The founding of the Delian League does not signal the birth of Athenian maritime expansion (which occurred much earlier), but, rather, the peak of its early development.

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91     Hdt. 7,144; Aristot. Ath. pol. 22,7. The latter provides the archon-year. Whatever the actual truth, the drift in the mood of the people will have been captured accurately by Hdt. For a discussion of the problems of Themistokles' "Naval Bill" see, most recently, Podlecki, op. cit. (n. 62), esp. 201-204.

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92     The "ostracizing out" of Aristeides in 483/82 is the only one that Hdt. (8,79,1) deems worthy of attention; for the date see Ath. pol. 22,8. (He was voted "out" only to be recalled in the nick of time.) In 487/86 the agon of the komodopoioi was added to the programme of the festival of the Great Dionysia (Suda *X 318).

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[92a     Cf., however, my more recent reconstruction of the sequence of these reforms, Chiron 19 (1989), esp. 355, IV (2).]

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93     Cf., e.g., Hignett, Hist. Ath. Const., 151; 175 (Rhodes, op. cit. (n. 36), 21 n. 4, however, does "not see why this practice should not have lasted until the reforms of Ephialtes").

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94     Cf. Hignett, op. cit., 175; cf. also Hammond, CQ 99 (1969) 118f. = Studies in Greek History (1973) 357. See esp. Fornara, op. it. (n. 36), 11f.

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95     Cf. Hignett, op. cit., 173f.; Ehrenberg, op. cit. (n. 27), 146.

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96     Cf. E. Meyer, Griech. Gesch.1 3 § 198 (notes); see Ath. pol. 25,2 (the legislation must antedate the archonship given for the takeover by the Five-Hundred from the Areios-Pagos-Council); Ath. pol. 26,3 clinches the case: E)PI\ *LUSIKRA/TOUS A)/RXONTOS DIKASTAI\ KATE/STHSAN (intransitive, active!) PA/LIN OI( KALOU/MENOI KATA\ DH/MOUS. (Flatly opposed: Hignett, op. cit. 176.)

If the name of the archon eponymos could attach itself to this innovation, it was because he was the first to be affected by it: just as we get, further down (26,2), the name of the first zeugites elected to the archonship — rather than the name of the archon eponymos during whose term the law that made possible the election to the archonship of a zeugites; cf. below n. 114.

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97     Most scholars think that one hundred would be a more reasonable figure (which seems oddly to hark back to the (now discarded, cf. n. 28) one hundred demoi of Kleisthenes).

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98     Although I adhere to the creed of reasonable textual conservatism which I have been taught by Professor Lesky, I do think that the present case meets the criteria of the responsible textual critic. The text as transmitted does not produce satisfactory meaning within its own context, nor in the interpretation of the historian. There is no obvious palaeographical explanation for confusing one hundred and five hundred (on the former figure cf. n. 97). Above all, however, we cite the different readings of the London Papyrus (L) and the fragment II b of the Berlin Papyrus (B). The intrusion into the text of an interlineal gloss of some puzzled reader surely would not be cause for surprise: the Ath. pol. does not mention preselection before sortition in its descriptive sections (ch. 55); it may have disappeared (Hignett, op. cit. (n. 93), 227). "Five Hundred" for "Council of Five Hundred" (as opposed to the Areios-Pagos-Council) recurs in 25,5. See, above all, 26,2 fin. with app. crit. See also Schwyzer, 2,26 n. 2 (article not repeated).

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99     Martin, op. cit. (n. 3), 26f. [= 190f.: "The lot, however, has, in the first instance, nothing to do with democracy, and everything with equality".]

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100     Martin, loc. cit. See Ath. pol. 26,2.

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101     The secretary must therefore have been elected — it was a neat way of avoiding the figure ten, which might have conveyed the mistaken notion of a state of emergency (as had occurred in 580/79, cf. Cadoux, op. cit. (n. 10), 102f.; and cf. Ath. pol. 38,1 — election of ten autokratores after the collapse of the Thirty). Detailed questions of procedure may be ignored, since the general policy seems so clear (e.g. the perennial question of "double representation" among the generals): there must have been exceptions to the rule (which otherwise could not be called a "rule"). (Cf. n. 50.)

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102     This would parallel the conjectured preselection by the Boule of the candidates for the generalship. I should regard this as strong mutually corroborating inferential arguing. Regarding the strategoi see above 208 with n. 51.

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103     Hdt. 6,109ff. Concerning the battle of Marathon cf. n. 82-87; Hammond, op. cit. (n. 94), 111ff. = 346ff. and esp. JHS 88 (1968) 13ff. = Studies in Greek History, 170ff. (expanded).

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104     See n. 94.

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105     Hdt. 6,109,1; Hdt. does not make it clear whether those opposed to giving battle favoured submission to the Persians or sitting it out behind the walls of Athens (of which "up until now no trace has been found": Travlos, Pictorial Dictionary of Athens (1971) 158).

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106     Hdt. 6,109ff. I cannot fight off the suspicion that the role of Miltiades in these events is unduly magnified. The historical fact which made this possible is provided by the indubitable (and presumably accidental) "imperium maius" of Miltiades on the day of the battle as a result of that peculiar procedure of rotating the supreme command. The other two factors which could have given rise to this tradition are the arguments of the defence at his last trial (Hdt. 6,136,2) and the fresco in the painted stoa (erected by the father-in-law of his son) (on the painting, cf. n. 85).

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107     Hdt. makes mention of Athenian strategoi nineteen times (Powell, Lex. Hdt.2, 338 col. 1): Melanthios (5,97,3; see above [208] with n. 53); the generals at Marathon (6,103-114; nine instances); the generals at Plataiai (9,44 and 46 — their only function is to receive and to transmit to Pausanias the message of Alexandros of Makedonia; four times); the generalship of Xanthippos son of Ariphron in 479 during the Sestos campaign after Mykale (7,33; 9,114-120; five).

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108     Ath. pol. 23,1.

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109     Not one of Berve's "fürstliche Herren der Perserzeit", but no doubt a strategos.

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110     Hdt. 6,132-136. Cf. Hermes 104 (1976) 285ff.

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111     Hdt. 9,114ff.; esp. 117 (the tern used is "the Koinon").

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112     This is not of course to say that it was the generals whose actions and attitudes had prompted the archonship reform: the diminishing of the stature of the strategoi, rather, was a welcome by-product of the reform of 487.

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113     Ath. pol. 23,1 (he directly links it to the inaction of the generals during the year of Salamis, cf. above [219] with n. 108). The credibility of the statement admittedly is not enhanced by the fact that Aristotle fits it into his neat scheme of metabolai (Ath. pol. 41); nor has he made up his mind as to whether this period of Areopagite resurgence occurred during (pol. 1304 a 20-24) or after (Ath. pol. 23,1f.; 1-5,1; 41,2) the Persian Wars (which term may of course include the 470s and perhaps even the 460s). But Aristotle's version is a lectio difficilior and may therefore derive from factual knowledge supported by evidence. If it is an inference on the part of Aristotle, this would go to his credit as historian. I should not, however, dare propounding my theories on the "evidence" of Aristotle. (A recent paper by R.B. Wallace, "Ephialtes and the Areopagos", GRBS 15 (1974) 259-269, appears to be trying to vindicate Aristotle by taking his statements as the starting point: I have chosen the opposite approach.)

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114     Ath. pol. 26,2.

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115     The chronological proximity was observed by Hignett, op. cit (n. 93), 176; his date for the archonship reform however, is different from ours (see n. 96).

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116     Cf. e.g., Ehrenberg, op. cit. (n. 27), 144; 147f.

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117     Plut. Aristeid. 7,7.

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118     Cf. above n. 55.

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119     See above [212] with n. 74-81.

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120     In the absence of a comprehensive and exhaustive publication and study by the excavator we are grateful to Professor Thomsen (see n. 55) for having gone through the Kerameikos finds.

My own strong doubts as to the validity of the prevailing current interpretation of the ostraka according to which they confirm what has always been suspected: see the text above) appear to be shared at least in part by Professor Mattingly (in a letter, March 5th, 1974) and Dr D. M. Lewis (see his paper "The Kerameikos Ostraka", ZPE 14 (1974) 1-4). (A) The solitary sherd with a little poem against Xanthippos (Raubitschek, AJA 51 (1947) 257-262; Meiggs and Lewis, no. 21, p. 42), in which he is called a terrible wrongdoer, reveals nothing, since there are myriads of ways in which one can do terrible wrong (apart from certain textual problems). (B) Kallixenos son of Aristonymos is repeatedly styled "Mede"; he even gets a little portrait depicting a bearded face topped with some unusual sort of head-gear. The allusion has the distinct ring of a joke and a nickname, as we know it from Old Comedy (cf. Mattingly and Lewis, loc. cit.). (C) Kallias Kratiou frequently is complimented as a PRODO/THS. Now, "traitor" is about the first, and the most general abusive term a Greek would utter in political cursing; even if Kallias did indeed betray somebody or something, we cannot tell what it was all about (did he perhaps sell the archonship reform to the townsfolk with untrue promises, concealing from them that it actually meant more power for the village nobles?).

I have not yet come across an explanation as to why it is only Kallixenos who is a "Mede"; why it is only Kallias who is a "traitor"; if both had been suspected of being in the business of betraying Athens to the King — non sequitur. In addition, both Professor Mattingly and now also Dr Lewis (loc. cit.) argue that Kallias Kratiou has to be eliminated from the 480s.

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[120a     Cf., however, my reassessment of tyranny in Athens in my study "Betrachtungen zur älteren griechischen Tyrannis", in: K.H. Kinzl (ed.), Die ältere Tyrannis bis zu den Perserkriegen (Wege der Forschung 510) (1979) 315, revised in AJAH 4 (1979) 36; English trans.]

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121     Cf. Schachermeyr, Griechische Geschichte2 (1969) esp. his "Anhang", 391-457; Die frühe Klassik der Griechen (1966) esp. 3ff.; 34ff.; 59ff.; 18lff.; 272ff.; 287ff.; Geistesgeschichte der Perikleischen Zeit (1971).

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